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1. Introduction
Since the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis, ample literature has claimed to
provide a definite solution to temper the current crisis and prevent a similar one altogether.
Hindsight has proven to be an important source of insight. Many reforms have already
been implemented (e.g. the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)) whereas other proposi-
tions are still on the drawing board. Perhaps the most applauded, but equally controversial
proposition, is the issuance of a Stability Bond (often called “Eurobonds” in the academic
discourse). Several (albeit often only slightly divergent) Stability Bond proposals have found
their way into the policy discussion. Our focus is on a Full-Fledged Eurobond design where
(new) sovereign debt is issued under a joint and several guarantee from all other participat-
ing member states. This implies that every participating country is up to the full amount
responsible for the reimbursement of the claimants, should the original obligor default.
A recent Green Paper authored by the EC (2011) provides a case for the introduction
of such a financial instrument. Among the benefits claimed to ensue, two are of importance
for this paper. The first argument provides a case for Stability Bonds as a way out of the
current sovereign debt crisis through its impact on debt dynamics. Pooling European debt
would prevent the current adverse debt feedback effect on the risk premium, allowing the
sovereign to get its debt back on a sustainable trajectory more easily [paragraph 1.2.1. EC
(2011)]. Second, a Stability Bond would shelter future sovereign debt from sudden shifts in
risk aversion, unwarranted market volatility or animal spirits. Hence, by enabling member
states to continually tap capital markets at a stable borrowing rate, a more resilient and less
volatile debt trajectory should ensue [paragraph 1.2.1. EC (2011)]. The first effect could be
seen as a beneficial “level” effect, the second a beneficial “volatility” effect.
The goal of this paper is to assess to what extent Stability Bonds deliver these claimed
benefits. First, how large is the impact of Stability Bonds on sovereign debt dynamics of
distressed member states? Second, are they able to reinforce stability in sovereign debt
dynamics? We investigate this by means of comparing (i) a baseline sovereign debt sce-
nario with (ii) a Full-Fledged Eurobond sovereign debt scenario. The member states under
consideration are Greece, Ireland and Portugal (for economy of notation, hereafter referred
to as “GIP”). Obviously, these countries are, at present, likely to gain the most from a
Eurobond issue (the rationale for considering only GIP is elaborated on later). Crucial to
the introduction of Eurobonds is that they might engender adverse incentive problems. Po-
tential moral hazard problems will require that Eurobonds are embedded very carefully in
an efficient and effective institutional framework that provides enough incentives to tackle
moral hazard problems. We relate the theoretical moral hazard problem to the specific
context of our Eurobonds analysis, showing that this is indeed an important aspect of the
analysis.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it adds to the vociferous discussion
concerning the introduction of Eurobonds. As of this writing, the Eurobond literature is
mainly conceptual in nature and at best based on “back-of-the-envelope calculations” when
illustrating the merit of Eurobonds on sovereign debt dynamics. Our aim is a more profound
and formal investigation. Second, with respect to sovereign debt analysis, our methodologi-
cal approach builds on recent recommendations by the ECB (2012) and IMF1 and diverges
from the traditional deterministic approach.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the rationale for Eurobonds
in the light of the sovereign debt crisis. The treatment is balanced, but not meant to be
exhaustive.2 Section 3 elaborates the methodological framework. In section 4 we build
a narrative around the empirical results and provide some additional insights. Section 5
concludes and identifies three policy implications.
2. The sovereign debt crisis: a rationale for Eurobonds
Since the onset of the crisis, (i) financial sector bailouts, (ii) rising unemployment, (iii)
falling tax receipts and (iv) stimulus spending all contributed to a deterioration of public
finances (ECB, 2011; Young and Semmler, 2011). The Euro area government debt-to-GDP
rose from a pre-crisis level of 66,4% in 2007 to 92,6% in 2012 (AMECO Database). The
1Cherif and Hasanov (2012).
2For a more detailed account on the various Eurobond proposals, see Claessens et al. (2012), De Grauwe
and Moesen (2009), EC (2011) and Hellwig and Philippon (2011).
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elevated debt positions raised concerns on the sustainability of sovereign debt (mainly in
peripheral member states). The latter in turn led to increased yield spreads which addition-
ally burdened sovereign debt dynamics.
From an academic perspective however, the assessment of debt sustainability is neither
firmly established nor standardised. A distinction is often made between (i) the long term,
when assessing debt sustainability and (ii) the short term, when analysing liquidity (ECB,
2012; Giammarioli et al., 2006; IMF, 2006). Informally, the former requires that the present
value of expected future primary balances equals (or surpasses) the current sovereign debt
position. The latter implies that the sovereign is able to meet all upcoming liabilities in
the short run. The two are linked through financial markets, where a sustainable debt out-
look (long term) implies investors are willing to provide liquidity (short term). Whenever
sustainability concerns arise, a sudden stop in market access can hamper the ability to roll-
over debt (liquidity). If the sovereign was de facto solvable, market sentiment can push a
sovereign into insolvency (a “bad equilibrium”). These mechanisms are well documented
in the theoretical literature. Kopf (2011) labels it the self-fulfilling nature of the sovereign
debt crisis, whereas Giammarioli et al. (2006) call it the creditor coordination problem. The
underlying mechanisms largely parallel that of a bank run (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). It
can be argued that the recent solvency problems of several sovereigns were of this nature.
This self-fulfilling mechanism is absent in a Eurobond scenario. Assume a hypothetical
sovereign “A”. A’s debt is financed in full through the issuance of Eurobonds. Now sup-
pose investors have doubts regarding the solvency of A (which de facto has a sustainable
debt position). However, questionable solvability of A does not incentivise investors to sell
Eurobonds issued by A: claimants can always turn to other participating member states (B,
C, D, ...) to pursue A’s obligations. Hence borrowing rates will not rise as before, which
saves A from a bad equilibrium.
The observed solvency issues in the euro area, however, are not unequivocally of a self-
fulfilling nature (De Grauwe, 2011). In effect, it can be argued that Greek sovereign debt
was already unsustainable long before investors withdrew from Greek national bond mar-
kets (Afonso, 2005). In the latter case, the observed risk premium is based on de facto
insolvency [the “Fundamentals-Based Argument” (Giammarioli et al., 2006)]. Presume a
hypothetical, initially solvable, sovereign “E” which finances its debt through the issuance
of Eurobonds. Suppose E is hit by a shock that causes its debt to no longer be sustainable
(e.g. as a result of a domestic banking crisis). Previously, such a situation would lead to
a sale of government bonds, which would drive up E’s borrowing rates. However, under a
Eurobond scenario, insolvency of the sovereign does not lead to a sale of Eurobonds issued
by E. Investors know that they are guaranteed to be reimbursed (by B, C, D,...), which
allows sovereign E to get its debt back on a sustainable trajectory without rising interest
rates making such an adjustment burdensome. In sum, a Eurobond allows in principle: (i)
a solvable sovereign to stay solvable and (ii) an insolvable sovereign to get its debt back on
a sustainable track.
Although praised by many, some observers have articulated serious concerns regarding
both the feasibility and the effectiveness of Eurobonds [see e.g. Issing (2009); Ko¨sters (2009);
Kopf (2011)]. We mention a set of three arguments that are too important to ignore: (i)
legal obstacles, (ii) political objections and (iii) economic concerns.
(i) First, in its current form, article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty prohibits any member state
to assume liabilities of other member states. Hence, certain Stability Bond designs will most
likely require a Treaty change (EC, 2011). In itself, this argument is not insurmountable.
It does, however, imply a long implementation time (Jones, 2010). Nonetheless, through
market expectations, the sole prospect of a Eurobond could immediately ease borrowing
conditions for distressed governments. In addition, a gradual introduction could already
achieve favourable results without requiring an immediate Treaty change (Claessens et al.,
2012).
In a way the ESM already implies a form of “mutualisation” or “federalisation” of debt:
if countries would not be able to repay support received from the ESM, the other countries
will need to write-off their contributions “pro-rata”. The AAA status of the ESM, however,
implies that it can borrow at the lowest cost, much lower than what the borrowing costs of
the distressed country would be. In a similar fashion, the ECB’s Securities Market Program
(SMP) that has substantially increased since 2011 as a reaction to the European debt crisis
could also be considered as an implicit mutualisation/federalisation of debt to the extent
that it is used to buy sovereign bonds of distressed member states.
(ii) Second, fiscally sound member states (most notably Germany) oppose, as a pooling
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of European debt might increase their funding costs. This argument carries doubt as the
scattered (empirical) evidence both confirms this claim (Berg et al., 2011) and opposes it
(EC, 2011; Matziorinis, 2012). In any case, the veracity of this statement is subject to the
specific design of the Eurobond (infra) causing such a general proposition to carry little
weight. Nonetheless, whether it is a zero-sum game or not, the prospect of a Stability Bond
crucially hinges on Germany’s willingness. This hurdle casts serious doubt on the prospect
of a Stability Bond. Note, however, that some other member states oppose as well. They
fear that Germany might consider its key role in the Eurobond market a justification to
meddle in foreign affairs (in particular, fiscal management of high deficit countries).
(iii) The third argument is perhaps the most forceful. Eurobonds could remove incentives
for budgetary discipline as they allow member states to freely tap capital markets without
incurring feedback on their borrowing rates (creating, in a way, a significant “common pool”
problem). In effect, as other member states foot the bill in case of default, market discipline
erodes and a laissez-faire fiscal policy might ensue (moral hazard).
An important literature on risk sharing and moral hazard problems in federal fiscal
constitutions provides more insight on potential moral hazard problems and how to design
adequate federal constitutions to deal with them. Eurobonds can essentially be considered
an application of this theoretical literature.
Persson and Tabellini (1996) analyse risk sharing and moral hazard in fiscal federations
taking a principal (voters)- agent (politicians) approach. It is shown that noncooperative
decision making in a fiscal federation is suboptimal and that there is a trade-off between
risk-sharing and moral hazard in a fiscal federation. The design of federal fiscal constitutions
is of crucial importance as it defines the degree of risk-sharing and may provide incentive
mechanisms to tackle moral hazard. More risk-sharing between the regions in a fiscal feder-
ation increases moral hazard as individual regions have less incentives to counteract shocks
and to increase the adjustment capacity of their economies if risk-sharing is larger. Com-
mitment problems can further aggravate the inefficiencies as it increases further the moral
hazard problem. It is argued that a horizontal “US-like” federal system provides more com-
mitment capacity (at this moment) than a vertical “EU-like” federal system. Centralisation
of tasks and power from a local to the federal level is likely to reduce moral hazard problems
but has to be weighted against inefficiencies inherent to centralisation such as bureaucracy
and lack of information of conditions at the decentralised level.
Bordignon et al. (2001) extend the previous analysis. The optimal regional redistribution
(i.e. degree of risk sharing) is determined in the presence of adverse selection problems and if
spillovers or commitment capacities vary. Asymmetric information over the size of regional
tax bases is focused upon: regional governments know more than the federal government
can incorporate in the transfer mechanism, resulting in an adverse selection problem. The
verifiability problem of the federal government leads to adverse incentive problems as re-
gional governments mask the real size of the regional tax bases and attempt to increase the
benefits from the federal transfer mechanism.
The relevance of this literature for the case of Eurobonds is quite clear: in the presence
of asymmetric information problems, moral hazard and adverse selection surface, generat-
ing potential adverse incentive effects from the introduction of Eurobonds that need serious
consideration. Eurobonds will also entail a trade-off between risk-sharing and moral hazard.
A careful design of the regulatory and governance framework of Eurobonds, i.e. the federal
fiscal constitution, can contribute to address the asymmetric information problems which
would undermine efficiency and sustainability of Eurobonds in the long run. At the same
time, it is important to note that there are also arguments to be made that Eurobonds
may actually contribute to more fiscal discipline and fiscal responsiveness, especially if they
further contribute to the strengthening of the fiscal governance framework, e.g. in the form
of more fiscal transparency, credibility and accountability.
3. Methodological framework
The paper commenced by posing two fundamental questions. Answering both requires
a comparison of future sovereign debt positions under a Eurobond versus a no-Eurobond
(baseline) scenario. To this end, this section provides a comprehensive breakdown of our
methodological framework. It is distinct from the classical body of literature and alludes to
recent recommendations by the ECB (2012), Bank of England (BoE) and IMF, with respect
to stochastic debt analysis.
We start by deriving the law of motion of debt-to-GDP [subsection 3.1]. This difference
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equation, embedded in a more elaborate debt framework, is solved iteratively forward in
time which allows us to establish a projection of future sovereign debt. However, instead
of considering one sole debt path, we simulate this equation numerous times under various
macroeconomic conditions (i.e. a stochastic instead of deterministic analysis). This requires
sensible macroeconomic scenarios, respecting the joint dynamics of macroeconomic variables.
The latter calls for an estimation of a vector autoregression [subsection 3.2] and a fiscal
policy rule [subsection 3.3]. Using these building blocks, we make an assessment of future
sovereign debt which we label the baseline scenario. Hereafter we tailor the above
baseline framework to cope with a Full-Fledged introduction of Eurobonds [subsection 3.4],
i.e. the Eurobond scenario.
We note that a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model could act as a
valid alternative (see e.g. in ’t Veld et al., 2012). However, given the trade-off between
theoretical soundness and data coherence in macro models (Liu and Theodoridis, 2012), we
prefer the VAR framework over a DSGE model to produce time series of our macro variables.
3.1. Sovereign debt dynamics: the equation of motion
The fundamental law of motion of debt-to-GDP dominates the debt sustainability liter-
ature3. Its main benefit is its ease of interpretation at the cost of some fundamental flaws.4
To address its shortcomings, some authors have recently developed more elaborate, albeit
less tractable, debt frameworks [e.g. Cline 2011, 2012; Contessi 2012; ECB 2012; Ferrucci
and Penalver 2003; Holland et al. 2011]. We too diverge from the traditional debt equa-
tion of motion and add some realistic features to it. As shown below, our approach carries
some appealing advantages. (i) First, it allows us to account for the maturity structure of
debt. This is crucial, as the effect of rising interest rates on debt sustainability hinges on
the amount of debt being rolled over in adverse market conditions. (ii) Second, it allows us
to mimic the empirical observation that distressed member states’ debt issuance is skewed
towards short term debt. (iii) Third, it allows us to model a tractable phasing in of Eu-
robonds, as proposed by Delpla (2010). (iv) Fourth, the approach is capable of handling
a more elaborate treatment of interest payments. (v) All countries under consideration re-
ceived rescue packages from the IMF and ECB. Our framework easily embeds the planned
repayment structure of these funds of the EFSF/EFSM/IMF (EC, 2013a,b,c).
We define Dt as the gross nominal stock of debt (subscript denotes the end of period),
GBRt as the gross borrowing requirement and PAY Bt as the amount of debt to be paid
back. Debt at time t equals debt at the end of the previous period plus newly issued debt
(gross borrowing requirement) minus the amount of debt reimbursed and adding a stock
flow adjustment (which measures any change in debt not related to GBRt and PAY Bt):
Dt = Dt−1 +GBRt − PAY Bt + SFADJt (1)
The gross borrowing requirement is the sum of interest payments (INTt) and the amount
of debt to be reimbursed (PAY Bt) minus the primary balance (PBt):
GBRt = INTt + PAY Bt − PBt (2)
where the primary balance is defined as net income minus non-interest expenditures. The
maturity profile of sovereign bonds and EFSF/EFSM/IMF assistance funds (necessary for
PAY Bt) are available from national debt agencies and Economic Adjustment Programmes.
We ignore the possibility of debt denominated in foreign currency as this amount is negligible
for the member states under consideration (Lojsch et al., 2011). Observe that substituting
equation (2) in (1) yields: Dt = Dt−1 − PBt + INTt + SFADJt = Dt−1(1 + it) − PBt +
SFADJt. The latter being the classic debt accounting equation.
Denote BLt and B
S
t as the amount of new long and short term debt, respectively, issued
during period t. We define BLt and B
S
t as having an initial time to maturity of ten and
one year respectively. Note that BLt +B
S
t = GBRt. In deciding what fraction of borrowing
requirements is met by short and long term debt respectively, we rely on historical issuance
practices. Define:
BLt = [α
L
t ]GBRt (3)
3dt =
(1+it)
(1+gt)(1+pit)
dt−1 − bt ; where it is the average interest rate of the debt stock; gt is the real annual
growth; pit is annual inflation; dt is the debt stock; bt is the primary balance.
4It assumes a constant value of inflation and growth. It presumes one sole interest rate for the entire
stock of debt and does not account for the maturity structure of debt.
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BSt = [α
S
t ]GBRt (4)
Where αLt and α
S
t are in turn defined as:
αLt = [µ]
iLt (5)
αSt = 1− [µ]i
L
t (6)
0 ≤ αLt , αSt ≤ 1;αLt + αSt = 1; 0 < µ < 1 (7)
(5) and (6) imply that a higher long term interest rate (proxying unfavorable market con-
ditions) skews borrowing towards short term debt.5 This accords with the observation that
distressed sovereigns have resorted more to short term debt during the crisis (De Broeck
and Guscina, 2011). The mechanics underlying (5) and (6) are related to the work of Arel-
lano and Ramanarayanan (2012) who develop a a dynamic model of international borrowing
with endogenous default and multiple maturities of debt. The parameter µ is estimated
from quarterly historical data (2002Q1-2012Q4), as explained below. Use of historical data
implies that borrowing behaviour will, with respect to maturity, converge to pre-crisis bor-
rowing standards when the economic climate does (Holler, 2013). Furthermore, the interest
payments are defined as (cf. Ferrucci and Penalver 2003; Cline 2012)6:
INTt =
θ∑
m=1
BLt−mi
L
t−m +B
S
t−1i
S
t−1 (8)
Where iL and iS represent the long (ten year) and short (one year) term nominal market
interest rate respectively. iLt−m and i
S
t−m represent the interest rate on newly issued long
and short term debt in period t-m respectively. θ represents the time-to-maturity of the
outstanding debt tranche with the farthest maturity date. Note that in our baseline scenario
we incur the market interest rate on new debt issued in the future, despite all three sovereigns
being able to draw on available EFSF/EFSM/IMF assistance funds (with an applicable lower
interest rate). This accords with the interpretation we give to the baseline scenario later on
(infra).
To allow for comparisons across member states, we will work with a normalised version
of this model (scaled with domestic GDP).7 In keeping with the literature we will, unless
stated otherwise, fix the value of SFADJt to 0 (e.g. van Aarle and Konings, 2013). Hence,
our central equation will take the form (9):
dt =
dt−1
(1 + gt)(1 + pit)
− pbt + intt (9)
Observe that this recursive formula is the classic debt equation found in the literature, but
is embedded in a larger framework. All variables are readily available from conventional
data sources (sources and technicalities are detailed in appendix A.1).
We now turn to the issue of modelling the variables entering (9):
〈
gt, pit, i
L
t , i
S
t
〉
in sub-
section 3.2 and 〈pbt〉 in subsection 3.3.
3.2. Modelling macroeconomic risk: a vector autoregression
Traditional debt solvability research fixes the values of gt, pit and pbt and simulates the
recursive expression (9) forward for future debt positions such that one deterministic debt
path ensues. To account for risk, this exercise is repeated under less favourable conditions
(e.g. lower growth, lower primary balance) by unilaterally adjusting the variables entering
(9) [e.g. see Contreras (2011); Holland et al. (2011)]. These bound tests (Berti, 2013) or
stress tests (EC, 2012) give a crude measure of the sensitivity of the baseline debt trajec-
tory to adverse macroeconomic conditions. This modus operandi, however, has three flaws
(Celasun et al., 2006). First, fiscal policy is deemed unable to respond to changes in the
economic environment - a stringent condition unlikely to hold in reality. Second, each debt
trajectory formally has a zero probability of occurrence. An unpleasant predicament if one
is to base policy recommendations on the analysis. Third, it neglects the joint dynamics of
5The domain of this function is R+, the range is (0,1).
6The assumption made is that interest rates are fixed after issuance. For empirical observations, see
De Broeck and Guscina, 2011.
7Dt
Yt
=
Dt−1
(1+gt)(1+pit)Yt−1
− PBt
Yt
+ INTt
Yt
+ SFADJt
Yt
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the economy.
One way to overcome these drawbacks is to estimate a reduced form vector auto re-
gression (Stock and Watson, 2001). This approach builds on seminal work by Garcia and
Rigobon (2004) and has figured prominently in recent publications by e.g. the EC (2012),
IMF and the BoE. It allows us to obtain time series of
〈
gt, pit, i
L
t , i
S
t
〉
. We estimate the
following reduced form VAR to capture the dynamics of the macro economy separately for
each country ([1]):
Xt = A0 +A1Xt−1 +A2Xt−2 +A3Xt−3 + ξt (10)
X
′
t = [gt, pit, i
L
t , i
S
t ]
E(ξtξ
′
t) = Ω
ξt
i.i.d.∼ N(0,Ω)
Where, as before, gt denotes real growth of GDP, pit equals inflation, i
L
t and i
S
t denote
long and short term nominal interest rates, respectively. A0 is a column vector of constants
[order 4x1], A1 to A3 represent matrices of autoregressive coefficients [order 4x4]. ξt denotes
a vector of well-behaved error terms with a time-invariant positive semidefinite variance
covariance matrix E(ξtξ
′
t) = Ω. Observe that the off-diagonal elements of Ω are potentially
non-zero. Dickey-Fuller tests reveal that all variables entering (10) are stationary [I(0)]. The
AIC criterion was used in lag length selection. In keeping with the literature, we do not
report the estimated coefficients of (10) as they do not easily lend themselves to a useful
interpretation.
We estimate the VAR based on quarterly data going from 2002Q1 to 2012Q4. Longer
time series, however, are available (going back to 1995), but including pre-euro years makes
the VAR sensitive to model specification; the slope coefficients in the VAR are in all like-
lihood altered when the sovereign adopts the euro [e.g. for inflation see Hartmann and
Herwartz (2009); for real growth see Barrell et al. (2008)]. To estimate Ω for Ireland and
Portugal, we use residuals spanning the time period 2002Q1-2012Q4 (thus including cri-
sis years). Leaving out crisis years produces a comparable Ωˆ. For Greece, we estimate Ω
based on 2002Q1-2007Q4 (thus excluding crisis years). Including 2008Q1-2012Q4 produces
roughly the same covariances (off-diagonal elements), but increases the variance (diagonal
elements) to an unwarranted degree. We suspect the time frame 2002Q1-2007Q4 to be bet-
ter suited for our analysis.
With a given set of coefficients of the VAR, we can simulate (10) forward in time. Each
quarter, we add shocks ξt, ξt+1, ..., ξT to the model (∀t ∈ [t, T ]) – see notes [2] for details
regarding the derivation of ξt. We repeat this procedure N times (number of simulations,
N = 25.000) to obtain N time series (with length 2013Q1-2020Q4) for each of the four
endogenous variables. We annualise the VAR variables as the analysis is on an annual basis
- see notes [3] for details. Note that this approach produces time series of
〈
gt, pit, i
L
t , i
S
t
〉
that
reflect realistic features of macroeconomic data: (i) persistence, due to the inclusion of the
lagged values of the endogenous variable. (ii) Volatility, due to the diagonal elements in Ωˆ
and (iii) correlation, as quantified by the off-diagonal elements in Ωˆ (Ferrucci and Penalver,
2003).
3.3. Projecting fiscal policy
Equation (9) contains pbt, which reflects fiscal policy behaviour. To model the latter, one
could follow three distinct routes. Somewhat rudimental, one could assume a pre-specified
fiscal policy rule (e.g. a balanced budget rule). The drawback is that such a fiscal rule
is deterministic, preventing flexibility whenever specific economic circumstances call for it.
For our purpose, to unequivocally tie the hands of the sovereign by a single policy rule
lacks credibility. Recall that we model a large number of macroeconomic scenarios, many
in which one single fiscal rule would end up being either too lax or too restrictive. On
these grounds, we discard the exogenous policy rule approach. Two alternatives are more
auspicious. A first is to include the quarterly primary balance (% of GDP) in the VAR
as an endogenous variable (Garcia and Rigobon, 2004). A second is to estimate a separate
panel fiscal reaction function (FRF) in which fiscal behaviour (pbt) responds to the economic
environment produced by the VAR.
Including the primary balance in the VAR has the benefit of yielding a fully endogenous
fiscal policy consistent with prevailing macroeconomic conditions. In addition, the VAR is
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allowed to produce a variance-covariance matrix of error terms (Ω) containing non-zero off-
diagonal elements (non-orthogonality). Accordingly, innovations (i.e. shocks) to the primary
balance are mutually consistent with shocks in other endogenous variables (an appealing
feature regarding growth shocks to capture automatic stabilization). This approach would,
to a large extent, circumvent the endogeneity issue to which we are vulnerable were we to
estimate a FRF. On the downside of these two advantages, some complications arise (Celasun
et al., 2006). One being economic in nature, the other data-oriented. First, by construction,
the VAR only includes lagged endogenous variables. The drawback here is that fiscal policy
is more likely to react to current events (or expectations of current events) in lieu of past
economic conditions. The magnitude of this error is possibly small (as all variables in the
VAR are persistent), but it would be erroneous nonetheless. Second, one would require the
quarterly seasonally unadjusted primary balance. However, this time series has an outspoken
seasonal component which one could only capture using a sufficiently long lag length. This
strong data requirement is not met by sufficient data availability. In addition, quarterly
fiscal data series have a low signal-to-noise ratio (as quarterly fiscal data is often measured
inaccurately). Both these considerations deter us from including pbt in the VAR.
Alternatively one could estimate a panel Fiscal Reaction Function (FRF) based on annual
data.8 Given the limitations of the VAR, this is the approach taken below. Following seminal
work by Gal´ı and Perotti (2003), we estimate a FRF of the form:
pbi,t = ψ0 + ψ1pbi,t−1 + ψ2Ei,t−1[gapi,t] + ψ3di,t−1 + ηi + εi,t (11)
t = 2000, ..., 2012; i = 1, ..., 12
εi,t ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2 )
Where pbt is the cyclically unadjusted primary balance (fraction of GDP). pbt−1 captures
persistence in fiscal policy. di,t−1(debt-to-GDP) accounts for a debt correction strategy
(Bohn, 1995). gapi,t represents the output gap and ηi captures unobserved country fixed
effects. Following the lead of Gal´ı and Perotti (2003) we include Ei,t−1[gapi,t] to recognize
the fact that fiscal policy decisions are typically implemented only after a time lag. However,
to estimate (11) we will substitute gapi,t for Ei,t−1[gapi,t] and instrument the former (infra).
We derive gapi,t using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter of 100
(Backus and Kehoe, 1992). ψ2 reflects both automatic stabilizers as well as endogenous
discretionary fiscal policy. (11) is estimated based on annual data from the 12 first-wave
Eurozone countries. Data sources and technicalities are detailed in appendix A.1.
When estimating a FRF, specific endogeneity issues come to the fore (Celasun et al.,
2006). A first concern is the correlation between gapi,t and εi,t. Hence, we instrument
gapi,t using the following instruments: Oil price (Oilt−1), US Output gap (GAPUSt−1), Infla-
tion (pit−1) and Openess (Openessi,t−1 = [Exporti,t−1 + Importi,t−1]/GDPi,t−1). Medeiros
(2012) and Gal´ı and Perotti (2003) and references therein provide a comprehensive discus-
sion regarding the validity and relevance of these instruments. Next, some member states
have a historic track record of high primary balances, which in turn causes a lower di,t−1.
Inclusion of ηi (country fixed effects) will prevent a bias of ψ3. Third, there is a possibility
of persistence of the error terms εi,t. The latter is overcome by including pbi,t−1.
The functional we will use in our simulation analysis takes the form – [4]:
pbi,t = ψ0 + ψ1pbi,t−1 + ψ2gapi,t|Xi,t−1 + ψ3di,t−1 + ηi + εi,t (12)
To enhance the fit of (12), we included several additional exogenous variables to our base
specification: (i) a fiscal rule index (measuring stringency) as published by the EC9 and (ii)
the German output gap (to account for the foreign business cycle). The latter turns out to be
significant but does not materially alter the coefficients in (12) (besides gapt). However, we
abstain from including the German output gap in our FRF since our analysis would require
ad hoc assumptions regarding its future values. Table 1 summarises these main regression
results. We note that our regression coefficients accord with those in the literature. For
brevity, we do not report the country fixed effects here (see appendix A.2 for the full-blown
regression table). In our simulation analysis, we will use regression specification (4) from
table 1.
8A FRF characterises the systematic budgetary response to the economic environment.
9See fiscal rule database European Commission.
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One note of caution is in order. Ideally one would like to estimate a FRF for each of the
sovereigns independently. Due to data constraints, however, this is not a viable alternative.
The panel approach solves this issue at the cost that the estimated parameters might not
truly reflect fiscal behaviour of each sovereign (ECB, 2012) – although the fixed effects
absorb some of the cross-country variation in fiscal policy. However, there is no getting
away from this issue and we found the panel estimation to be the dominant approach in the
literature [see e.g. Eller and Urvova´ (2012); Medeiros (2012)].
Table 1: Estimation results FRF Euro area countries (2000-2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No IV/No FE IV/FE IV/FE IV/FE IV/FE
pbt−1 0.764∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(13.62) (10.34) (10.40) (10.43) (9.85)
dt−1 0.00434 0.0672∗∗ 0.0628∗∗ 0.0623∗∗ 0.0589∗
(0.72) (3.03) (2.75) (2.80) (2.19)
gapt 0.162
∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ -0.100
(2.30) (4.12) (3.39) (3.64) (-0.63)
Fiscal Index -0.00181
(-0.31)
Gap Germany 0.718∗∗∗
(4.36)
ψ0 -0.00710 -0.0435
∗∗ -0.0406∗ -0.0403∗ -0.0353
(-1.59) (-2.72) (-2.48) (-2.51) (-1.86)
N 140 140 140 140 130
Countries 12 12 12 12 11
R2 0.6197 0.6791 0.6806 0.6807 0.7315
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
IV: instrumental variables. FE: country fixed effects.
We drop Germany from specification (5). Specifications (2)-(4) use different sets of instruments.
Given (i) the debt framework, (ii) the VAR and (iii) the FRF we now briefly comment on the
iteration process that underlies the empirical distribution functions of future dt. Starting
from t = 2012, the VAR yields projections for g2013, pi2013, i
L
2013, i
S
2013. The output gap in
(12), which is derived from g2013 (and past GDP data), is inserted into the FRF (12).
The latter returns pb2013. This yields all the variables required for the debt framework
at t = 2013, of which the key output variable is d2013 (which enters the FRF in the next
period). This process iterates forward ∀t ∈ [2013, 2020]. We repeat this algorithm N times
(number of VAR simulations). The stochastic nature of the VAR therefore spills over to
the FRF and debt framework, thus generating probability profiles for
〈
gt, pit, i
L
t , i
S
t , pbt, dt
〉
which we depict using fan charts.
The fan charts we construct in this way are labelled Baseline scenarios. Before we
proceed, it is important to stress what these baseline scenarios represent – and what they
do not. First, they do not represent a forecast of sovereign debt we expect to truly prevail
in the future. They are, in this respect, different from the debt sustainability exercises
typically found in reports by the EC, IMF, ECB, etc. who aspire just that. The main
reason is that our approach does not account for the sizeable structural reforms (e.g. labor
markets reforms, considerable privatizations, tax reforms, etc.) and fiscal consolidation
efforts such as detailed in the latest Economic Adjustment Programmes (EC, 2013a,b,c) and
IMF country reports (IMF, 2012a,b, 2011). Therefore, our debt baseline scenarios reveal
what debt dynamics would have looked like absent such interventions (a “no policy change”
scenario). Neglecting these structural reforms and measures in our debt projections allows
us to later assess the impact of Eurobonds on sovereign debt dynamics without their effect
being confounded with policy measures with budgetary relevance. In addition, the omission
of these aspects from our analysis does suggest a direction in which our baseline scenario is
“biased” vis-a`-vis the baseline scenarios set out in the Economic Adjustment Programmes
or IMF country reports. We revisit this issue below when discussing our results.
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3.4. Tailoring the Baseline scenario to Eurobonds
The above vector autoregression (10) and FRF (12) reflect the baseline - no Eurobonds
- scenario. We now tailor both to reflect the Full-Fledged Eurobond scenario. In
the Eurobond scenario we assume an introduction scheme, kin to Delpla (2010), where the
sovereign starts issuing Eurobonds after a date of introduction. Old debt remains under
national guarantee. New (Eurobond) debt is fully backed by participating member states.
Recall that the VAR contains two equations that determine the domestic nominal long
and short term interest rate. Under a Eurobond scenario, these interest rates are substituted
by iLEUt and i
SEU
t (EU superscript refers to Eurobond). This approach is similar to Stock
and Watson (2001), who - in their application - swap an interest equation in the VAR with
a Taylor rule. We define iLEUt and i
SEU
t as:{
iLEUt = i
L
GER + εiLEU
iSEUt = i
S
GER + εiSEU
(13)
where iLGER and i
S
GER are average yields on the ten and one year German bund respectively.
This is in keeping with the Eurobond literature that argues that the Eurobond rate will
likely be close to the German interest rate (see EC, 2011). 〈εiLEU , εiSEU 〉 are stochastic
error terms, to be interpreted as shocks to the Eurobond rates (and are compatible with
the uncertainty that currently exists in the Eurobond literature w.r.t. the expected interest
rate). They have the following variance-covariance matrix10:
Σε =
[
V ar(εiLEU ) Cov(εiLEU , εiSEU )
Cov(εiSEU , εiLEU ) V ar(εiSEU )
]
(14)
We also define a new Ωˆ′ which updates Ωˆ as follows:
Ωˆ =
[
A B′
B C
]
⇒ Ωˆ′ =
[
A B′
B Σε
]
The original C block is replaced with its Eurobond counterpart Σε. There are no economic
priors which suggest that the elements in B (B′) will alter in a Eurobond scenario. With
respect to the A block, one could argue that lower variances in the errors of 〈gt, pit〉 will
ensue under a Eurobond scenario (see e.g. Matziorinis, 2012).11 Recognizing the possible
validity of this argument, we nonetheless preserve the original variances. In doing so, we
shut down one channel through which Eurobonds could lower volatility in sovereign debt
trajectories. Observe that this leads our analysis to provide a lower bound when assessing
the impact on debt trajectory volatility.
Eurobond time series of
〈
gt, pit, i
LEU
t , i
SEU
t
〉
are obtained from the VAR (10) – with the
interest rate process swapped with (13). New periodic shocks ξ
′
t (4x1 vectors) are obtained
as before – with Ωˆ replaced with Ωˆ′. Note that our approach implies that domestic funda-
mentals (i.e. gt, pit) do not impact Eurobond rates (see 13)
12. This assumption does not
sacrifice any realism given the small weight in the Eurozone of the member states under
consideration. Somewhat more restrictive is that domestic fundamentals are not influenced
by spillovers from core Eurozone countries. Should a lower growth in the VAR be interpreted
as a signpost of a downturn in Germany, it is unlikely that Eurobond rates would stay con-
stant. Hence, at this point, it is key to stress that our analysis ignores those spillovers.
Note that this substitution approach (13)-(14) is subject to the Lucas Critique (Lu-
cas, 1976). It is paramount for our analysis to ponder if the introduction of Eurobonds
would impact the estimated parameters in our VAR or FRF. First, reconsider the FRF
(12)13. Will Eurobonds alter fiscal behaviour summarised in our FRF? The answer is: it
depends. It depends on whether the design of the Eurobond succeeds in containing moral
hazard. To see this, consider the parameter ψ3, which reflects austerity measures taken
to reduce the debt position of the sovereign. At present, the rationale of these austerity
measures is, inter alia, to counter an increase in the debt position. Ultimately, the aim is
10All parameters in (13) and (14) are estimated from quarterly historical post Euro entrance data.
11There are no economic priors which suggest an alteration of the autoregressive coefficients pertaining to
〈gt, pit〉 contained in A1 −A3 in (10).
12Note that there is no causality present in ξ
′
t.
13For the VAR we could not identify any economic priors to which the Lucas Critique would apply.
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to prevent an elevated debt position to raise solvency doubts which in turn would trigger
higher borrowing rates. When Eurobonds are introduced, the latter channel is null and void.
An unwarranted increase in the debt position no longer incentivises sovereigns to pursue a
debt correction strategy as it will not affect their borrowing terms. This is exactly the moral
hazard argument we encountered before. Below, we will vary ψ3 to illustrate what the effect
of moral hazard (lower ψ3) will be on our results.
We have now tailored the baseline framework we developed earlier to the Full-Fledged
Eurobond scenario. Hence, we repeat the previous analysis with this adapted framework.
The same ζt vectors are used, but they will necessarily produce different ξ
′
t than those used
in the baseline scenario. In sum, any difference between the two scenarios will ensue due to
(i) a different interest rate process (level effect) and (ii) a different constellation of shocks
(volatility effect).
4. Sovereign debt projections
As stated, the sovereigns subject to our analysis are (i) Greece, (ii) Ireland and (iii)
Portugal. The reason of choice is threefold. First, as detailed above, our model hinges on
the presumption that the Eurobond rate is not influenced by domestic fundamentals. This
is valid for GIP since their GDP represents a mere 1.5%, 1.3% and 1.3% of European GDP
respectively (a similar claim can be made regarding their debt positions). This constancy
of the Eurobond rate would be unlikely to hold for EU heavyweights (such as Italy or
Spain), where an increase in debt or a downturn in growth could plausibly deteriorate
the Eurobond rate. Second, the economic structure of GIP is diverse; the Irish economic
structure is distinct from that of Greece and Portugal (e.g. relatively labour intensive
production process, lack of innovation, large public sector, inefficient state-owned companies,
etc.). Third, the debt-interest rate relationship varies considerably for these three sovereigns.
Greece has a large debt position coupled with elevated borrowing rates. Ireland and Portugal
have had comparable debt positions over time, but Irish interest rates have tended to be
lower than those observed for Portugal. These interest-debt differentials allow us to probe
the impact of different starting positions of debt/interest on debt dynamics.
At each future moment in time, we obtain an empirical distribution of dt. An appealing
way to present our results is by drawing fan charts for dt, kin to the inflation charts drawn
by the BoE. Fan charts depict the empirical probability distribution function of variables
over time.
4.1. The baseline scenario.
Figure 1 (Panel a, c and e) plots the baseline fan charts of debt-to-GDP for GIP. Figure 1
(Panel b, d and f) plots fan charts for the applicable long term interest rate process. For
Portugal and Ireland, the starting year of our debt projections is 2013Q1. As a result of
data constraints, our starting date is one year earlier (2012Q1) for Greece. We project debt
positions up until (and including) 2020Q4 for all three member states. The outer bounds in
Figure 1, 2 and 3 represent the 10% and 90% deciles (including the 5% and 95% percentiles
clouds the quality of the fan charts). Similar to the historically observed debt pattern, the
debt process is not smooth (and at times non monotonously decreasing) but characterised
by “kinks”. The reasons are, inter alia, that (i) we do not assume a constant repayment
rate, (ii) nor do we assume a constant growth rate of nominal GDP, (iii) allow for discrete
shifts in the interest burden
When evaluating debt sustainability, we follow Hamilton and Flavin (1986): if dt spirals
upward (i.e. non-stationairity of dt) it is unsustainable. (i) We observe that debt tends to
remain unsustainable in Greece. After a small decline, brought about through the stock
flow adjustment14, Greek debt continues to rise. (ii) Portuguese debt is monotonously on
the rise (but at a decreasing rate), reaching a median debt projection of 158.21% by 2020.
(iii) Irish debt is slowly recovering, reaching 112.25% in 2020. Observe that for GIP, the top
10% decile is quite large (when compared to the bottom 10% decile), suggesting upside risk
in debt dynamics.
In Figure 2 we compare our baseline scenarios with those included in the corresponding
14Due to its sheer size, we account for a restructuring of Greek sovereign debt of -36.4% of GDP in 2012
[i.e. a stock flow adjustment due to private sector involvement, see EC (2013d)]. No stock flow adjustments
are made hereafter for Greece and none at all for Ireland and Portugal.
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(a) Baseline debt chart Portugal. Dashed
line: IMF country report (p. 47, IMF
2012b).
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(b) Baseline interest chart Portugal.
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(c) Baseline debt chart Greece. Dashed line:
IMF country report (p.71, IMF 2011).
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(d) Baseline interest chart Greece.
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(e) Baseline debt chart Ireland. Dashed line:
IMF country report (p. 48, IMF 2012a).
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(f) Baseline interest chart Ireland.
Figure 1: Baseline scenario debt-to-GDP and LT interest.
IMF country reports. For GIP, we observe that our pbt is lower than IMF projections in early
years (due to smaller fiscal consolidation efforts and no structural reforms). Our interest
rates on new debt lie above those in the IMF country reports. This is to be expected as
the projected borrowing rates in the IMF baselines accounts for the EU/IMF & bilateral
facilities whereas our borrowing rates are purely market rates. Moreover, our interest rate
process converges back to stationary values at a slower pace than anticipated in IMF/EC
reports. Our convergence process reflects the dynamics that would prevail absent structural
reforms. In reality, these reforms spur market confidence which leads to lower yields. Our
VAR reflects future dynamics of iLt , i
S
t based on historic dynamics (reflected by A1 − A3 in
(10)) – which fully accords with what we aim to capture with our baseline scenario. With
respect to growth, we note that IMF projections are at the upper bound of our fan charts.
Figure 1 also contains the baseline debt projections of the IMF (which is a deterministic
debt path). In view of all the above, we observe that our debt fan charts are biased upwards
vis-a´-vis IMF baselines for GIP – as expected ex ante. The difference is the largest for
Greece and the smallest for Ireland.
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(a) Greece. Primary balance.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p. 71, IMF 2011). Fan
chart: our analysis.
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(b) Greece. Average inter-
est rate on newly issued debt.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p. 71, IMF 2011). Solid
blue line: our analysis.
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(c) Greece. Real growth.
Dashed black line: IMF country
reports (p. 71, IMF 2011). Fan
chart: our analysis.
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(d) Portugal. Primary balance.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p. 47, IMF 2012b – missing
values interpolated). Fan chart:
our analysis.
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(e) Portugal. Average inter-
est rate on newly issued debt.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p. 52, IMF 2012b). Solid
blue line: our analysis.
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(f) Portugal. Real growth.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p. 47, IMF 2012b – missing
values interpolated). Fan chart:
our analysis.
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(g) Ireland. Primary balance.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p. 48, IMF 2012a – missing
values interpolated). Fan chart:
our analysis.
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
Av
er
ag
e 
no
m
in
al
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
 Ir
el
an
d
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Year
(h) Ireland. Average nominal
interest rate on public debt
[INTt+1/Debtt]. Dashed black line:
IMF country report (p. 48, IMF
2012a). Solid blue line: our analy-
sis.
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(i) Ireland. Real growth.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p. 48, IMF 2012a). Fan
chart: our analysis.
Figure 2: Comparing Baseline scenarios with IMF Baseline scenarios. We use IMF country reports because
they are (i) more explicit in the underlying assumptions and (ii) more standardised across countries than
the EC Economic Adjustment Programmes. For each country we use the country report available at or near
the starting date of our projections (such that IMF projections make use of the same data as we do).
4.2. The Full-Fledged Eurobond scenario.
Next, Figure 3 (Panel a, b and c) plots the projected debt path under a Eurobond
scenario. Figure 3 (Panel d) plots the new Portuguese long term interest rate process,
which is similar for Greece and Ireland (the same holds true for the short term rate). (i)
For Portugal, we observe that Eurobonds have the potential to quickly neutralise the pre-
viously observed rise in sovereign debt. It yields a median debt position of 132.85%, which
is 20 percentage points lower than the baseline scenario in 2020. (ii) Whereas Greek debt
was rising before, we observe that Eurobonds have the potential to revert the adverse debt
dynamics downward, reaching 153.94% by 2020 (median projection). (iii) For Ireland we
observe that median debt-to-GDP is 94.43%, roughly 20% lower vis-a`-vis that observed un-
der the baseline scenario.
A comparison of Figure 1 [Baseline] and Figure 3 [Eurobond] suggests what an intro-
duction of Eurobonds could have achieved instead of the structural reforms/bailout pack-
ages/large fiscal consolidation efforts. We observe the effects from Eurobonds to be material.
For Greece and Portugal, we see that Eurobond debt dynamics leads to sustainability, but
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(d) Eurobond long term interest rate
Figure 3: Full-Fledged Eurobond design for GIP.
debt would still be materially higher than what is projected in the IMF country reports, sug-
gesting the importance of structural reforms in these countries. For Ireland, debt dynamics
now resembles the scenarios put forward in the IMF country report, which incorporates all
structural reforms (tax reforms, health sector reforms, etc.). In no case do we argue that
Eurobonds would have been an equally worthy substitute to these (necessary) structural
reforms, but the comparison does bring normative significance to the table.
In appendix A.3 we present the Eurobond counterpart of Figure 2. We observe that our
Eurobond rate (which is identical for GIP) to be lower than that projected in the IMF re-
ports. When compared to our Baseline scenario, we observe that both gt and pbt are higher
in the Eurobond scenario.
4.3. Further analysis
4.3.1. Moral hazard in the fiscal reaction function
We now investigate the sensitivity of our Eurobond results with respect to ψ3, the debt
correction parameter that embodies a potential moral hazard problem. We analyse only
the impact of moral hazard - not its likelihood of occurrence. In Figure 4, each curve
plots the median debt position at the end of year t ∈ [2013, 2020] when ψ3 is unilaterally
allowed to vary. E.g., if one were to start on the curve for t = 2016 on the lower square
(d2016 = 171.4%) in panel a, with ψ3 = 0 during t = 2017, we would arrive at the upper
square (d2017 = 184.5%) at the end of 2017. The crossing of two time adjacent curves
identifies a year-on-year steady state (STST) debt correction strategy (ψ3). These year-
on-year STST strategies are situated very close to each other, thereby identifying a “range
of STST debt correction strategies” (the shaded grey area). In the case of Portugal and
Greece, the debt correction parameter from table Table 1, column 4 (which point estimate
equalled 0.0623) falls in the zone of STST debt correction strategies, whereas it surpasses
it in Ireland. The implication of this observation is that, under a Eurobond scenario, if
Greece or Portugal are to lower their debt correction (ψ3) due to moral hazard, debt would
quickly become unsustainable. In Ireland, however, some slack in fiscal policy is possible.
Concisely, our results suggest that the “margin of moral hazard” is small (if not absent);
moral hazard immediately has repercussions on debt sustainability. The policy implication
is that a Eurobond design should at worst allow only a very small margin of moral hazard.
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Figure 4: Moral hazard allowance. Median dt vs. ψ3.
4.3.2. Depressing volatility in debt forecasts
Figure 5 plots the ratio of the second central moment (variance, solid line) and the third
standardised moment (skewness, dashed line) of our annual debt-to-GDP forecasts under
the baseline and Full-Fledged scenario.15 We observe that the variance is lower in the Full-
Fledged Eurobonds scenario (Vt > 1), enabling policy-makers to narrow the uncertainty of
debt forecasts (as the interest volatility is - to large degree - taken out of the equation).
This benefit increases over time and is quite large. We observe that the variance of our
debt projections are reduced more than half when Eurobonds are issued. The skewness
is, in both scenarios, positive (indicating long right tails). This positive skewness can be
interpreted as the upside risk in debt dynamics and is found to be of lower magnitude in
the Eurobond scenario (St > 1). The average skewness in the baseline (Eurobond) scenario
was 0.11 (0.083) in Portugal; 0.19 (0.18) in Greece; 0.22 (0.18) in Ireland. Note that the
non-smooth behaviour of these ratios is, due to confounding of many determinants, difficult
to interpret.
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Figure 5: Moments Portugal, Greece, Ireland. Solid line: Vt. Dashed line: St.
5. Conclusion
Europe finds itself at a crossroads: more or less unification. This paper assesses the
effect on debt dynamics of more unification through the issue of a common debt instrument:
a Eurobond. The countries under consideration were Greece, Ireland and Portugal, i.e. pe-
ripheral member states currently under stress. We briefly summarise the main results and
infer three policy implications from the analysis.
A first insight is the normative significance of Eurobonds on sovereign debt, a benefit
which before has only been claimed but not really formally assessed. Our fan charts of the
Full-Fledged Eurobond design reveal that the median debt projection of 2020 declines with
roughly 20 percentage points (Portugal and Ireland) and 50 percentage points (Greece) vis-
a`-vis a baseline scenario. This level effect on sovereign debt is non-negligible and certainly
underscores the economic rationale of Eurobonds as claimed in paragraph 1.2.1. of the rel-
evant Green Paper EC (2011).
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Vt =
σBaselinet (
Debt
GDP
)
σFull−Fledgedt (
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;St =
SkewnessBaselinet (
Debt
GDP
)
SkewnessFull−Fledgedt (
Debt
GDP
)
(15)
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A second implication is the depressed debt volatility brought about by the stable interest
environment. We found the moments of sovereign debt distributions to be more favourable
under Eurobond scenarios, halving the variance and lowering the upside risk in debt dy-
namics through a lower skewness. These results allow for a more efficient sovereign debt
management as claimed in paragraph 1.2.1. EC (2011).
The last implication concerns potential pitfalls concerning Eurobonds. The successful
introduction of Eurobonds requires that asymmetric information problems - leading to moral
hazard and adverse selection - are tackled successfully in its design.
– Notes
[1] We note that Cherif and Hasanov (2012) recommend including lagged debt (dt−1)
as an exogenous variable in the VAR to account for possible feedback on the interest
rates. In effect, as argued by Di Cesare et al. (2013), sovereign debt has become an
important determinant of market interest rates. Although we recognize the possible benefit
of including (dt−1), careful considerations deter us from doing so. (i) For the member
states under consideration, (dt−1) was found to be non-stationary [I(1)] (cf. van Aarle
and Van Hove (2012) for Ireland; van Aarle and Kappler (2011) for Greece; Contreras
(2011) for Portugal). (ii) De Grauwe and Ji (2012) show that the relationship between the
interest rates and dt was significantly altered throughout the crisis. Accounting for this
shift in market behaviour using structural breaks requires too much degrees of freedom.
(iii) Currently, the VAR framework is a distinct building block in our analysis; simulating
the VAR forward in time to obtain time series of
〈
gt, pit, i
L
t , i
S
t
〉
does not require the debt
framework (1)-(9) nor the FRF (11). However, including dt−1 would tie the VAR to both
the debt framework and the FRF as dt−1 is required to be periodically updated (using
the debt framework and the FRF) and re-entered in the VAR. This requires us to, period
by period, derive the quarterly output-gap (as it is included in the FRF). As shown by
Hodrick and Prescott (1997), estimates of the output gap at the end of the time series are
typically noisy, which therefore threatens the quality of the estimated output gap included
in our FRF. Due to all the above, we abstain from including dt−1 in the VAR specification.
[2] Deriving quarterly shocks ξt (4x1 vectors). The procedure described below origi-
nates from the work by Sims (1980) and is the standard approach in the stochastic debt
literature – see e.g. Celasun et al. (2006); Tanner and Samake (2008); Cherif and Hasanov
(2012); Medeiros (2012); Penalver and Thwaites (2006); Eller and Urvova´ (2012); Garcia
and Rigobon (2004). The variance-covariance matrix of the residuals Ωˆ characterizes the
joint statistical properties of the contemporaneous disturbances of the endogenous variables
in the VAR. As the errors are contemporaneously correlated, we first orthogonalize the
errors through a Cholesky decomposition of Ωˆ: Ωˆ = B′B. B [order 4x4] is an upper
triangular matrix (i.e. all entries below the main diagonal are zero). The entries on
the main diagonal of B are the standard deviations of all structural shocks. Using B,
quarterly shocks for the Monte Carlo simulation (ξt) are obtained as follows: ξt = Bζt
where ζt ∼ N(0, 1), where ζt is a 4x1 vector. For a discussion concerning the importance
of the the ordering of the variables in our application, see Garcia and Rigobon (2004). We
repeat this procedure N times (i.e. the number of simulations is 25.000) for a time horizon
of 8 years (i.e. T = 32 quarters) to arrive at NT vectors of ξt.
[3] The debt accounting framework [subsection 3.1] is based on annual variables whereas
the VAR framework projects quarterly values of gt, pit, i
L
t and i
S
t . We annualise the VAR
predictions of the endogenous variables before they enter the debt accounting framework
(and fiscal reaction function). For iLt and i
S
t we take the arithmetic mean of the four
quarters. For gt and pit we annualise using
∏
(1 + gt) − 1 and
∏
(1 + pit) − 1 respectively.
This process is identical to the annualisation procedure which underlies these variables in
the AMECO database.
[4] Observe that using (12) in our simulation model requires us to obtain future val-
ues of gapi,t. gapi,t (for t=2013,...,T) is obtained using the VAR in which we include gi,t
(real growth). Starting from real GDPi,2012 we obtain a time series of real GDPi,t of
arbitrary length. The latter is appealing as the calculation of the output gap using the HP
filter is typically noisy at the end of the time series. Our approach allows us to lengthen
the time series of future real GDPi,t by enough to overcome this drawback.
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Appendix A. Appendix
Appendix A.1. Data sources
Table A.2: Data sources VAR
Variable Source
Quarterly long term interest AMECO Database
Quarterly short term interest Datastream
Quarterly inflation EUROSTAT
Quarterly real growth (seasonally unadjusted) EUROSTAT
Table A.3: Data sources FRF
Variable Source
Annual debt-to-GDP EUROSTAT
Annual nominal GDP EUROSTAT
Annual real GDP EUROSTAT
Annual inflation EUROSTAT
Annual oil price ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
Annual primary balance (seasonally unadjusted) ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
US output gap World Economic Outlook Database
Openess ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
Fiscal rule index European Commission, Fiscal Rule Database
Table A.4: Debt framework
Variable Source
Repayment Schedule Ireland EC, 2013a & NTMA year reports
Repayment Schedule Greece EC, 2013b
Repayment Schedule Portugal EC, 2013c
Annual Long Term Interest AMECO Database
Annual Short Term Interest AMECO Database
Table A.5: Other
Variable Source
Historic German bund yields (10 year maturity) AMECO Database
Historic German bund yields (1 year maturity) Datastream
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Appendix A.2. Estimates FRF
Table A.6: Estimation results FRF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No IV/No FE IV/FE IV/FE IV/FE IV/FE
pbt−1 0.764∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(13.62) (10.34) (10.40) (10.43) (9.85)
dt−1 0.00434 0.0672∗∗ 0.0628∗∗ 0.0623∗∗ 0.0589∗
(0.72) (3.03) (2.75) (2.80) (2.19)
gapt 0.162
∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ -0.100
(2.30) (4.12) (3.39) (3.64) (-0.63)
Belgium -0.0176 -0.0163 -0.0162 -0.0150
(-1.59) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.21)
Finland 0.0174 0.0164 0.0163 0.0203∗
(1.79) (1.67) (1.68) (2.00)
France -0.00313 -0.00348 -0.00352 -0.00932
(-0.36) (-0.40) (-0.41) (-1.11)
Germany -0.00127 -0.00124 -0.00124 -0.00255
(-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.31)
Greece -0.0570∗∗∗ -0.0538∗∗∗ -0.0535∗∗∗ -0.0387∗
(-3.89) (-3.56) (-3.64) (-2.05)
Ireland 0.00203 0.000901 0.000775 0.00224
(0.18) (0.08) (0.07) (0.17)
Italy -0.0274∗ -0.0255∗ -0.0253∗ -0.0255
(-2.14) (-1.96) (-1.97) (-1.67)
Luxembourg 0.0372∗ 0.0346∗ 0.0343∗ 0.0345
(2.49) (2.27) (2.30) (1.90)
Netherlands 0.00415 0.00350 0.00343 0.00318
(0.47) (0.40) (0.39) (0.33)
Portugal -0.0109 -0.0108 -0.0107 -0.0118
(-1.27) (-1.26) (-1.25) (-1.14)
Spain -0.0000998 -0.000773 -0.000848 0.00277
(-0.01) (-0.08) (-0.09) (0.24)
Fiscal Index -0.00181
(-0.31)
Gap Germany 0.718∗∗∗
(4.36)
ψ0 -0.00710 -0.0435
∗∗ -0.0406∗ -0.0403∗ -0.0353
(-1.59) (-2.72) (-2.48) (-2.51) (-1.86)
N 140 140 140 140 130
Countries 12 12 12 12 11
R2 0.6197 0.6791 0.6806 0.6807 0.7315
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix A.3. Eurobond scenarios
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(a) Greece. Primary balance.
Black dashed line: IMF country re-
port (p.71, IMF 2011). Fan chart:
our Eurobond scenario.
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(b) Greece. Average inter-
est rate on newly issued debt.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p.71, IMF 2011). Solid
blue line: our Eurobond scenario.
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(c) Greece. Real growth.
Dashed black line: IMF country
reports (p.71, IMF 2011). Fan
chart: our Eurobond scenario.
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(d) Portugal. Primary balance.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p. 47, IMF 2012b – missing
values interpolated). Fan chart:
our Eurobond scenario.
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(e) Portugal. Average inter-
est rate on newly issued debt.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p.52, IMF 2012b). Solid
blue line: our Eurobond scenario.
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(f) Portugal. Real growth.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p. 47, IMF 2012b – missing
values interpolated). Fan chart:
our Eurobond scenario.
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(g) Ireland. Primary balance.
Dashed black line: IMF country
report (p. 48, IMF 2012a – missing
values interpolated). Fan chart:
our Eurobond scenario.
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(h) Ireland. Average nominal
interest rate on public debt
[INTt+1/Debtt]. Dashed black line:
IMF country report (p. 48, IMF
2012a). Solid blue line: our Eu-
robond scenario.
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Figure A.6: Comparing Eurobond scenarios with IMF Baseline scenarios.
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